

Attachment to
USIB-D-41.5/39, Final
(COMOR-D-24/31)
USIB-Approved
21 November 1962

A Program for Photographic Reconnaissance of Cuba

1. With the dismantling of the MRBM/IRBM sites in Cuba and the removal of most of the missile equipment from Cuba, the intelligence needs of the community can no longer be expressed in terms of "offensive weapons" alone. During the course of the past week this change in intelligence needs has been reflected in modifications of the emphasis given various aspects of our reconnaissance program. It is therefore appropriate at this time to review the present program of reconnaissance, to determine the immediate and continuing intelligence needs, and to determine the reconnaissance program appropriate to their satisfaction.

2. The current intelligence requirements susceptible of satisfaction by reconnaissance are continuous knowledge of the deployment and operational status of significant weapons systems already known to be in Cuba, and detection of any new weapons systems as they are brought in to Cuban ports and deployed throughout the island. This information is required to provide our policy makers with a continuous picture of the Soviet/Cuban posture, and to provide our planners with the detailed information they need to plan for and, if necessary, conduct operations in Cuba.

3. Expressed in terms of reconnaissance collection means, we can divide the requirement into four categories:

- a. Periodic surveillance of known installations
- b. Periodic and special reconnaissance of Soviet shipping
- c. Special coverage of specific, selected objectives
- d. General search

4. Surveillance. There are several weapons systems known to exist in Cuba which require regular and frequent coverage to maintain a current estimate of their capabilities, and the extent of Soviet plans to use them. These include primarily the IL-28 bomber forces, the MIG-15, 17, 19 and 21 jet fighters and fighter bombers, the suspect Soviet Army infantry and armored installations and vehicle parks, the coastal cruise missiles, and the KOMAR PGMs. These installations

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and weapons demand frequent cover at the present time, although changes in the situation may modify the frequency required. There are other weapons systems and military installations which require surveillance, although not so frequent as those systems just mentioned. In this category can be placed the SA-2 sites, the secondary naval forces, the exclusively Cuban army encampments, the secondary airfields. Finally the status of Cuban/Soviet defenses in the vicinity of certain specific areas, such as Drop Zones and Landing Beaches, must be ascertained at regular intervals. All of these requirements can only be satisfied in the main by overhead reconnaissance. In large measure, the SAC U-2 program, BRASS KNOB, can provide the bulk of the cover, supplemented at intervals, particularly in the case of ground force equipment, by a program like the [REDACTED] Specific objectives, with proposed frequencies and type cover recommended are listed in TAB A.

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5. Shipping Reconnaissance. There remains in Cuba, at Mariel and Casilda, equipment associated with the MRBM/IRBM sites. It will be necessary to continue reconnaissance of these ports until this equipment has been removed. There are also ships enroute to Cuba at the present time, as well as ships already in Cuban waters, which are known to have participated in the arms lift earlier this year. In order to determine expeditiously what new military equipment is being brought into Cuba, it will be necessary to maintain relatively frequent surveillance of the primary ports with on call high resolution reconnaissance to identify the types of equipment in each case. Much of the general information will be available from other sources, especially CINCLANT's Fleet Air Reconnaissance program. However, the greater part of our knowledge will require overhead reconnaissance of the ports, while the ships are in, with both high and low altitude aircraft. See TAB B for specific objectives.

6. Special Coverage. From time to time intelligence will be received, from a variety of sources, which will indicate the presence of various military installations and weapons. In order for policy makers to act upon this intelligence, confirmation will be desirable. This confirmation can best be provided by overhead photographic reconnaissance.

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The existence of reported installations can generally be confirmed, and their location precisely determined, by high altitude U-2 photography. In some cases this will also be sufficient to ascertain the nature of the installation. In other cases, however, only low level, high resolution cover can provide the photo quality necessary to an accurate determination of function. There will also be installations detected by high altitude search cover which will require low level confirmation and identification. In view of the extensive use of cover and concealment by the Soviets, this low level coverage will need to be frequent. In addition there may be need for photographic evidence of military installations which policy makers can use in the various forums where they deal. All of these needs will require overhead reconnaissance, using both high and low level aircraft, of selected installations on a one-time cover basis. Some examples of objectives in this category, which are awaiting verification at the time of this writing, will be found in TAB C.

7. Search. The nature of our intelligence activities in regard to Cuba is such that new installations could be built undetected or new equipment brought in and deployed without our knowledge. To protect against this potentiality, there is a need for frequent search cover of the entire island to detect new installations (including any suspect nuclear storage sites) and new deployments of weapons. There will also be a need for determining, by aerial search of relatively large areas, the exact location of weapons or installations reported to be present. Under current conditions, BRASS KNOB on a periodic basis appears to offer the most potential for accomplishing such a task. Weather permitting, weekly coverage of the entire island is required.

8. Conclusions. Our current program of reconnaissance using a mix of high and low level photo reconnaissance is essentially what we must continue for the foreseeable future if we are to satisfy our outstanding intelligence requirements.

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9. Recommendation. It is recommended that the program* be approved as defined in the attachments hereto, TABs A, B, and C. The tabs will be updated on a continuing basis.

/s/
James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead
Reconnaissance

*

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COMOR requests that it be kept advised of the availability, readiness, and performance capabilities of such special recce capabilities in order that it may adjust its requirements accordingly.

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T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

Tab A
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Periodic Surveillance Objectives

<u>Objectives:</u>	<u>COMOR Number</u>	<u>Frequency Desired</u>	
		<u>High Altitude</u>	<u>Low Altitude</u>
A. <u>Airfields</u>		Daily	Weekly/On-Call

Daily high altitude coverage of airfields listed is required to determine:

1. Location, type, and number of aircraft,
2. Unusual concentration or dispersal of A/C.

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4. Operational status of airfield.

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25X1A

San Julian A/F
Holguin A/F
Camilo Cienfuegos
San Antonio de los Banos
Camaguey A/F



B. <u>Major Military Encampments</u>	Daily	Semi-weekly/On-Call
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Although daily high-altitude coverage will detect a major change, low-level coverage is needed on a semi-weekly basis if we are to maintain current our estimates of Soviet ground force equipment and personnel, or to make a determination of the capabilities, groupings, and possible missions of these forces.

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Artemisa
Remedios
Santiago de las Vegas
Holguin



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Tab A (cont.)

<u>Objectives</u>	<u>COMOR Number</u>	<u>Frequency Desired</u>	
		<u>High Altitude</u>	<u>Low Altitude</u>

C. <u>Cruise Missile Sites</u>		Weekly	On-Call
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Cruise missile sites will require high altitude coverage on the order of once a week in order to detect any changes to the sites. Any indications of change will require immediate low-level coverage.

Siguanea
Banes
Santa Cruz del Norte
La Sierra
Campo Florida
Guerra

25X1A

D. <u>KOMAR PGMG</u>		Weekly	Weekly/On-Call
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25X1B

25X1A

Maríel Naval Base
Banes Naval Base

E. <u>SA-2 Sites</u>		On-Call	On-Call
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Based on experience to date, we consider that on-call high-altitude coverage will be adequate to keep track of any changes in the general SA-2 picture. Low-altitude photography has provided some good technical detail and on-call coverage by low-altitude aircraft can still add a great deal when circumstances dictate.

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Beaches, Drop Zones

Twice Weekly

On-Call

CINCLANT contingency plans require accurate up-to-date infor-

Guantanamo Base Area

Twice Weekly

On-Call

To maintain an updated ground order of battle, i.e., concentration

Secondary Airfields

Weekly

On-Call

Weekly high-altitude coverage of secondary airfields is required

1. Operational status of the airfield,

2. Unusual concentrations or dispersal of A/C.

3. Location, type, and number of A/C.

Low-altitude coverage required as specific items are identified

Secondary Military Ground Forces Weekly

On-Call

Current contingency plans and national estimates require detailed

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Tab B

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Shipping Surveillance

A. It is imperative that daily surveillance by means of high altitude aircraft be obtained of certain key ports in Cuba. This requirement is necessary in order to first ascertain which ships are in port and whether they have any potential for loading or unloading military cargo. Once this information is obtained by photographic means (or any other available means) low level coverage will be necessary in order to ascertain the exact nature of the cargo being off loaded. Equally important will be the determination of what military equipment is being loaded for shipment out.

Havana
Mariel
Santiago de Cuba
La Isabela
Casilda
Matanzas
Cardenas
Cienfuegos
Punta Gerardo
Caibarien

B. Secondary ports requiring weekly high altitude surveillance:

Bahia Honda
Nuevitas
Punta Alegre
La Coloma
Nueva Gerona
Moa Bay
Cabanias

C. Addition of secondary or other ports to any days lists should be made a matter of decision based upon information that ships are enroute or expected.

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

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